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Higher Education Development in India and China: 
South Asian, Sinic, and Pan-Asian alternatives 
Le développement de l’enseignement supérieur en Inde et en Chine: Des alternatives sud-
asiatiques, chinoises et pan-asiatiques 
 
Hantian Wu, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto 
Neville Panthaki, Independent Researcher 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the development of higher education in India and China over three time periods: colonial 
India and semi-colonial China, the Cold War during which India was “non-aligned” and “new China” embraced 
Communism; and the period after India’s neoliberal economic reforms and China’s “reform and opening-up.”  
Our study focuses on the second period when the rationales for post-independence higher education policies were 
intimately connected to sovereignty.  A historical cross-comparative analysis is being employed to discern 
similarities and differences between India’s and China’s development of higher education systems.  The purpose 
of our study is to contextualize the sociopolitical philosophies that guided the development and transformation of 
higher education systems in India and China with reference to their vision as non-Western civilizations.  We 
utilize this historical analysis to discuss whether India and China will remain peripheral in the global system of 
knowledge production, or provide distinct South Asian, Sinic, and/or Pan-Asian alternatives in the future.  
 
Résumé 
Cette étude enquête sur le développement de l’enseignement supérieur en Inde et en Chine sur trois 
périodes : l’Inde coloniale et la Chine semi-coloniale, la Guerre Froide au cours de laquelle l’Inde était 
« non-alignée » et la « Nouvelle Chine » embrassait le communisme ; et la période après les réformes 
économiques néolibérales de l’Inde et « la réforme et l’ouverture » de la Chine.  Notre étude se concentre 
sur la deuxième période quand les justifications des politiques d’enseignement supérieur après 
l’indépendance étaient étroitement liées à la souveraineté. Une analyse historique comparative croisée est 
utilisée afin de discerner les similarités et les différences entre le développement des systèmes 
d’enseignement supérieur de l’Inde et de la Chine.  Le but de notre étude est de contextualiser les 
philosophies socio-politiques qui ont guidé le développement et la transformation des systèmes 
d’enseignement supérieur en Inde et en Chine, en référence à leur vision de civilisations non-
occidentales.  Nous utilisons cette analyse historique afin de discuter dans quelle mesure l’Inde et la Chine 
resteront en périphérie du système globale de production de savoirs/connaissances, ou fourniront des 
alternatives distinctes sud-asiatiques, chinoises et/ou pan-asiatiques à l’avenir. 
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Mots-clés : enseignement supérieur ; Inde ; Chine ; développement ; Guerre Froide ; centre-
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Introduction 
India and China have their own historical heritage in higher education (HE) development, and their 
experience of HE modernization has been different from that of the West.  In this paper, we seek 
to develop a comparative analysis of how the historical context has shaped the development of 
modern HE systems of India and China.  The history of HE development in both countries can be 
divided into three periods: (1) colonial India before its independence (1947) and semi-colonial 
China before the Communist Revolution (1949), (2) the period after India’s independence (1947) 
and China’s Communist Revolution (1949), and (3) the period after India’s neoliberal economic 
reforms (1991) and China’s “reform and opening-up” policy (1978).  Our main focus is the second 
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period when “non-aligned” India and “isolated” China developed their HE systems within the 
environments of respective government initiatives, which sought to assert postcolonial sovereignty 
and path independence within all social and economic sectors of the nation.  During this period of 
great dynamism in both India and China, alternate-to-Western visions of modernity and 
development were conceptualized and became the basis for policy formulation and long-term 
strategic planning.  We also consider the pre-independence education traditions of these two 
ancient civilizations as essential to the analysis of HE development in both countries.  
Altbach (2001) has argued that although both India and China had made significant 
progress at the end of the 20th century, these two countries nevertheless remained “gigantic 
peripheries” in the international system of knowledge production.  Altbach pointed out that “all 
contemporary universities are based on the Western model, regardless of their locations” (p. 200), 
and that “no developing country has made a serious attempt to build a new university model” (pp. 
200–201).  This present structure and operation of the modern university has clearly been derived 
from a model of the Western experience.  Having become the normative global standard for HE, 
this model of the university was adopted by India and China (Kapur & Perry, 2014; Mahbubani & 
Chye, 2015; Yang, 2014).  Indeed, it has been repeatedly noted that “no viable alternatives to the 
[Western] university have emerged […] and that all modern institutions of HE […] have common 
roots in the European historical experience” (Altbach, 2006, pp. 121–122).  However, given their 
civilizational and historical contributions, is it not possible that contemporary India and China 
might develop a South Asian, Sinic, or possibly a Pan-Asian alternative within the world 
knowledge system? We employed a historical cross-comparative analysis to discern similarities 
and differences of HE development in India and China, considering their respective civilization 
patterns, modernization processes, postcolonial political ideological roots, and development 
strategies especially during the Cold War period.  The comparative analysis may make it possible 
to anticipate their potential future role in the world system of knowledge production.  
The purpose of this study is to understand the current challenges faced by India and China 
as they seek to enhance their respective worldwide cultural influence and status in the world 
knowledge system through the ongoing development of their HE systems.  Within the article, we 
concentrate on the macro-historical mapping of national strategies of HE development in India and 
China.  Our three research questions are: (1) How have history and context shaped the approaches 
and strategies for HE development in India and China? (2) How do these specific historical 
dimensions of HE inform their contemporary approaches to HE development? (3) Will India and 
China remain peripheral to the HE development, or will they bring fresh epistemological and 
institutional patterns that may shape a global university model in future? 
 
A Brief Review of Relevant Literature 
As emerging economies with the world’s first and second largest HE systems, India and China 
together have recruited about 25% of the world’s HE-level students (Altbach, 2009a).  In 2014, 
India had overtaken the United States in HE enrollment, becoming the world’s second largest HE 
system in terms of student numbers with an enrollment of 20 million (Altbach, 2014).  In China, 
from the early 1900s to the late 2000s, its HE enrollments increased from 5 million to 27 million 
(Altbach, 2009b).  As two of the most rapidly growing economies, both India and China have 
regarded HE as the key to national development.  Altbach (2009b) argued that although “both 
countries are giving priority to HE to produce highly educated personnel and high quality research” 
(p. 39), India and China’s current importance in the world knowledge system “is largely unrelated 
to their own policies but results from the exodus of students and professionals to the West […] 
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since the 1970s” (p. 43).  He went on to suggest that neither India nor China have taken advantage 
of their rich indigenous intellectual and academic traditions.   
During its colonial period under British rule, India’s HE system remained fragmented, 
compartmentalized within ethno-religious boundaries.  The British spent few resources on HE, 
restricting it to the development of an India-wide system for the licensing of colonial 
administrators (Altbach, 2014).  Post-independence, India began systematic reforms to implement 
a national model of HE under central (federal) as well as state (provincial) control.  However, 
government defence spending severely contracted education budgets.  India was involved in a 
series of regional conflicts with China, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which was coupled with a series 
of provincial insurgencies.  This amounted to nearly the entire Cold War period.  As Altbach 
(2014) noted, the present situation regarding funding of Indian HE remains unchanged: “despite 
considerable rhetoric in the past few years about India’s HE ‘takeoff’ and the link between HE and 
recent economic growth, there is little evidence that [its] economic success has had much effect 
on improvements in HE” (p. 504). 
In terms of China’s modern HE development, Yang (2011; 2013) pointed out that tensions 
still exist between China’s traditional educational model and the imposed Western models.  From 
a historical perspective, Chinese educational institutions had a fundamentally different relation 
with the state compared to the situation in the Western model rooted in the European medieval 
universities (Yang, 2011).  In terms of the present situation, China’s policy in HE development, to 
some extent, inherited the philosophical core of its reform in the 19th century (Yang, 2011), 
following the mentality of “keeping the Chinese substance and adopting Western techniques for 
their usefulness [zhong ti xi yong].  He concluded that “the development of Chinese modern 
universities has always been confronted with the absence of both classical and modern ideas of 
university;” while “Chinese long-standing traditions never attempted to seek the ontological 
significance of knowledge, top priority has always been given […] to practical demands” (Yang, 
2011, p. 352).  Above all, India and China as two emerging economies with increasing worldwide 
influence and rapid growth in both the economy and HE, their respective histories play a significant 
role in present HE development.  Considering their respective historical roots related to HE 
development and present challenges in enhancing global influence and international status, it 
seems appropriate to seek answers from history for providing suggestions to both countries for 
their future actions and strategies.  Therefore, it is necessary to investigate and compare the 
historical processes of HE development in India and China to further reveal their influences.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework developed for this paper was informed by dependency theory and the 
centre-periphery model.  We regard India and China as “gigantic peripheries” in HE (Altbach, 
2001, p. 199) while noting how that status is now changing.  Zha (2014) noted that there is a direct 
correlation between a strong state and HE development.  Using this logic, we suggest that after 70 
years of post-independence socioeconomic development, contemporary India and China now have 
the potential to develop a South Asian, Sinic, or Pan-Asian alternative (Mahbubani & Chye, 2015).  
We based our hypothesis on the resilience of civilizational characteristics that India and China 
displayed through their histories, which have informed their HE development and modernization 
experiences.  
Dependency theory describes the relationship between developing and developed countries 
as “the outcome of domination by the ‘have’ countries over the ‘have-nots’ ” (Eckstein & Noah, 
1984, p. 213).  Following this theory, the centre-periphery model was developed as a “metaphor 
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which describes and attempts to explain the structural relationship between the advanced or 
metropolitan ‘centre’ and a less developed ‘periphery’ ,” commonly applied to the relationship 
between developed and developing countries (Scott & Marshall, 2015, para.1).  Applying the 
centre-periphery model to the world system of knowledge production, HE systems can be 
categorized as centres which have always dominated the production and distribution of knowledge 
or as peripheries which have tended to be dependent on the centres (Altbach, 2006).  Regarding 
the development of peripheries, dependency theorists recommend de-linking from the global 
capitalist system, or attempting to reduce the degree of their exploitation in the international 
context.  During the Cold War era, in an effort to escape de facto global political bipolarity, post-
independence India and China attempted to establish their own modern HE systems, which were 
neither wholly Western nor wholly Soviet.  The Indian and Chinese HE systems were shaped by 
policies whose rationale stressed sovereignty preservation and referenced their rich cultural 
histories of education.  
Many scholars argue that HE systems should be free of state control and generated by the 
market rather than planned by state-centred bureaucrats and politicians (Johnstone, 1999; Larabee, 
1997; Pusser, 2008).  Zha (2014) has noted, however, that China has taken advantage of a strong 
state when developing its HE system.  Zha (2014) has argued that “a well-ordered society requires 
a strong state, the rule of law, and democratic accountability. . .[and] it is also a strong state that 
must come first, while states that democratize before acquiring the capacity to rule effectively, are 
likely to fail” (Zha, 2014, p. 48).  We could infer that periphery countries such as India and China 
require strong government as a precondition for establishing and developing HE systems.  What 
is noteworthy, however, is that in contrast to China’s sustained history as a centralizing state with 
national meritocratic examinations (Marginson, 2011), India’s centralization has only emerged 
since 1947 (independence).  Nevertheless, developments in both countries during the second 
historical period reflect a strong determination to develop a socioeconomic model capable of 
preserving national sovereignty while promoting rapid industrialization. 
 
The Precolonial Past: Historical Roots and Civilization Patterns 
To appreciate the impact of the deep-rooted civilization patterns on their respective modern HE 
systems, we first review the precolonial legacies of HE in India and China.  There were two 
pedagogical traditions that were layered together in ancient India before the arrival of Persian-
influenced Islamic traditions: the indigenous traditions of the subcontinent’s aboriginal peoples 
(the Adivasis), and the Dharmic traditions of what is today considered Hinduism and Buddhism 
(Mookerji, 1944).  The features of ancient Indian education “at its best and at its earliest” were 
“revealed in Vedic literature, especially the literature of the Brãhmanas, Upanishads, and 
Ärariyakas” (Mookerji, 1944, p. 63).  The most notable centres of education were not located in 
urban areas but within the lush surroundings of forests.  It is obvious that the attachment to the 
natural environment as an atmosphere for proper and inspired teaching and learning is an Adivasi-
inspired concept rather than one that owes its origins to the pastoral and post-urbanized Aryans of 
the Indian subcontinent.  During the Vedic age (about 1500–500 B.C.E), teaching and learning were 
a collaborative effort of self-reflective practices where “the constant touch between the teacher 
and taught was vital to education” (Mookerji, 1944, p. 66).  Under this model, learning experience 
was individualized, and the aim of education was mainly to attain an enlightened “self-fulfillment” 
(Mookerji, 1944, p. 67).  Education was the process by which the acknowledgment of the 
phenomenon of interdependence was acquired.  This wisdom was demonstrated by promoting 
social harmony in accordance with natural and divine law (Crozet, 2012).   
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Following the nomenclature of the Vedic period, associated with the production of the 
pedagogy of the Four Vedas (canon), the Upanishad period was one of intense questioning and 
educational reform where the precepts of the Vedas, the organization of society, and the purpose 
of education was contested (within the works of the Upanishads).  This was a period of pedagogical 
evolution (circa 500 B.C.E–1000 C.E.), diversification, and reinterpretation or questioning of the 
primacy of the Vedic texts.  Siddhartha Gautama (The Buddha: 563–482 B.C.E.) was a product of 
the Upanishad era.  The characteristics of Indian HE during the height of its Buddhist period were 
reflected in the curriculum of Nalanda “university” in the 7th century C.E.  According to the writings 
of two Chinese monks Xuanzang and Yijing who visited Nalanda during their travels in India in 
the 7th century C.E., Nalanda’s curriculum had five major components in addition to Mahayana 
Buddhist texts: discourse analysis [sabdavidya], arts [silpasthanavidya], diagnostic medicine 
[cikitsavidya], epistemology [heuvidya], and metaphysics [adhyatmavidya] (Pinkney, 2015).  
Contrasting with the cultural diversity of the Indian subcontinent, ancient China was 
predominantly a unified empire with a highly systematic civil service system based on 
Confucianism.  Confucianism is the most important philosophical tradition of education in ancient 
China, although Taoism and Buddhism also profoundly influenced Chinese intellectuals’ spiritual 
world.  Confucianism became China’s official philosophy in the mid-2nd century B.C.E. (Wang, 
1990), and thereafter became the philosophical basis of education in ancient China through the 
establishment of official academies and the imperial examination system (Gan, 2011).  The Han 
dynasty created China’s first imperial academy in 124 B.C. to teach official posts candidates 
Confucian classics, making Confucian education serve the state (Marginson, 2011).  In the 6th 
century C.E., the Sui dynasty established a fully systematized three-grade imperial civil service 
examination system [keju], with the roles of training and recruiting scholar civil servants firmly in 
place by the time of Empress Wu Zetian (624–705) of the Tang dynasty (Marginson, 2011). 
After a long process of development, Chinese classical institutions of higher learning “had 
reached their definitive form in the 12th century”, which was “largely due to the emergence of 
Song neo-Confucianism as the dominant form of scholarship, and the work of several great [neo-
Confucian] scholars” (Hayhoe, 2001, p. 327).  In the Song dynasty (960–1279), “the formal pole 
of traditional Chinese higher learning, imperial institutions at capital, provincial and prefectural 
levels which administered the civil service examinations [keju], had reached institutional forms 
that were relatively stable—the taixue, the guozijian, the Hanlin academy” (Hayhoe, 2001, p.326).  
In terms of non-governmental HE institutions (HEIs), the academies [shuyuan] developed from 
private libraries and Buddhist temples served as alternative institutions for scholarly research 
outside the imperial bureaucracy and examination system (Hayhoe, 2001).  The curriculum in Song 
academies reflected the characteristics of ancient Chinese HE during this period and mainly 
contained the Four Books and Five Classics [Sishu Wujing], Song Dynasty neo-Confucianism 
scholars’ commentaries, as well as history and poetry (Song Yuan Xue An; cited by Liu, 2014).  
It is clear that in ancient India and China, HE was an outgrowth of philosophical and 
spiritual systems.  If we regard both historical traditions as mental states, their HE may be 
considered examples of holistic education.  The learning process in ancient India was an endeavour 
to develop the mind, body, and spirit through the comprehension of the human biosphere and 
theological precepts.  In ancient China, the aim of learning, in the words of the Great Learning 
[Da Xue], one of the Four Books [Si Shu], was “self-cultivation, family harmony, state-governing, 
and world peace” [xiushen qijia zhiguo pingtianxia] (Zhang, 1998).  According to Hayhoe and Liu 
(2010), “Confucian scholarship tends to focus on understanding history and human 
interrelationships and to explore issues of good governance, from the local to the global” (p. 94).  
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Ancient India and China focused on imparting knowledge from what is presently considered the 
field of humanities and social sciences, and they also had interdisciplinary traditions of integrating 
different subjects.  It is also noteworthy that both India and China were source civilizations that 
exported knowledge, culture, and philosophy throughout the ancient world.  From 1500 to 1800, 
“Europeans were influenced by China because they regarded Chinese culture as superior, and they 
were receptive to borrow from China” (Mungello, 2005, p. 77).  Of course, this situation changed 
dramatically during the period of Western imperialism.  
 
The Encounter with Imperialism and HE Modernization: The Historical Context of Modern 
HE systems in India and China 
Next, we review and compare HE modernization processes in India and China during the colonial 
era when both civilizations moved from the “centre” to the “periphery” of the world knowledge 
system.  Colonial rule by Great Britain in India was exercised by the East India Company (1600–
1857) prior to India formally becoming a part of the British Empire (1858–1947).  During this 
period, Indian pedagogies were eclipsed by British attempts to implement Western education.  In 
1835 Thomas Babington Macaulay delivered his Minute on Education to the British Governor 
General’s Council of India.  Macaulay expressed the view that a loyal bureaucratic class of Indians 
could be produced through an English-medium education system (Macaulay, 1835).  In agreement, 
Governor General Lord William Bentinck issued a proclamation replacing Sanskrit and Persian 
with English as the official language of governance and administration.  Western-style universities 
were established in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in 1857 following the model of the University 
of London (Choudhary, 2008).  The Indian Universities’ Commission, organized by the Viceroy’s 
administration in 1902, furthered the replication of British colonial education by strengthening the 
utilitarian aspect of the curriculum in Indian universities.  In response to such efforts, Indian 
nationalists organized the National Council for Education in 1906, which proclaimed an Indian 
boycott of British institutions of HE in India (Mukherjee & Mukherjee, 1957).  
While a British HE model was imposed in India by the British colonizers, China adopted 
several different Western HE models in an effort to combat political instability and to promote 
national defence.  Even though China was officially independent prior to 1949, in reality a situation 
of semi-colonization existed.  During the self-strengthening movement [yangwu yundong] 
launched in 1860, Western technology was introduced for the purpose of national salvation, and 
one of China’s earliest modern government institutions of higher learning, the School of Combined 
Learning [tong wen guan] was established for providing education in specific areas needed to deal 
with the Western incursion (Hayhoe, 1996).  In 1905, the civil service examination [keju] was 
ended by the Qing government; China’s traditional HEIs as part of the old system lost their 
legitimacy and viability.  China attempted to establish modern HE by importing a Japanese model 
(before 1911), followed by European models (German and French), and subsequently the U.S. 
model promoted by John Dewey.  By the 1930s, the Nationalist Chinese government had reverted 
to European models for HE (Hayhoe, 1996).  
During their respective colonial and semi-colonial eras, India and China’s ancient 
education traditions were interrupted by the imposition or adoption of Western HE models.  China 
abolished its imperial examination system and tried to establish modern institutions that drew on 
foreign models for self-strengthening.  In India, the purpose and function of HE shifted from an 
indigenous understanding of education for self-reflection to the British practice of education for 
the breeding and licensing of colonial bureaucrats, or the subcontracting of imperial functionaries.  
During these processes, India and China became peripheral countries of global knowledge 
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production, and were transformed from major source civilizations known for exporting cultures 
and philosophies to oppressed colonial and semi-colonial societies that were recipients of Western 
knowledge and culture.  Most importantly, India and China were characterized by the West as 
“premodern,” as intellectually inferior civilizations with regard to their HE capacity to contribute 
to politically stable, economically vibrant, and military capable nation-states.  
 
The Post-Independence Cold War Era: Development Ideologies and HE Systems within the 
Context of Geopolitics 
Having reviewed the historical heritage, we now analyze the geopolitical context surrounding 
Indian and Chinese post-independence development ideologies, and their relation to HE reform 
and development.  After its independence in 1947, India began to construct an endogenous 
ideology. Its political elements were social-democratic and state-controlled market protectionism.  
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru described himself as a “socialist and republican” (Kotovsky, 
1989).  He developed his ideology based on a fusion of elements including socialism, capitalism, 
Gandhian Swaraj (cultural sovereignty and social autonomy), and nationalism (Kotovsky, 1989; 
Zhu, 1998).  Nehru proclaimed his intention to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy in an effort to 
preserve India’s political sovereignty amidst Cold War bipolarity (Ganguly & Pardesi, 2009).  He 
believed this was required in order for India to retain the sovereignty of its actions toward 
autonomous development.  In 1955, along with the leaders of several “Third World” countries, 
Nehru as the “acknowledged senior statesman” chaired the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung.  
This gathering of newly independent former colonies grew in participants; it became the impetus 
for the Non-Aligned Movement (GCIS, 2001, para.1).  
During the Indian national struggle for independence, aspirations were raised regarding the 
character of the postcolonial Indian state.  For the Indian National Congress, which transitioned 
from the leader of an anti-imperial struggle into the ruling government of an independent country, 
developing the national economy and social welfare became paramount, given that India had 
emerged impoverished from imperialism and out of the ethnic violence of the partition of South 
Asia in 1947.  Under the guidance of Nehru’s ideology of the “middle-way,” India’s economic 
policy became a combination of central planning and limited free market protectionism.  Similar 
to the Soviet model, India devised Five-Year Plans and developed a state-owned economy in the 
field of basic and heavy industries.  Yet there was also government support for the development 
of the private sector (Zhu, 1998).  The Indian government strictly limited foreign trade and 
investment until the beginning of liberal reforms in the 1990s (Kelegama & Parikh, 2003).  
Constraints of revenue and concerns that education should facilitate rapid heavy industry 
development caused successive post-independence Indian governments to focus their education 
policy in the area of university reform.  Rather than beginning comprehensive and systemic 
education sector expansion, the Indian policy was to create institutions for scientific and technical 
skills acquisition.  
HEIs in independent India are recognized by the University Grants Commission which was 
created by the University Grants Commission Act in 1956.  Central universities, HEIs operated by 
the federal state, were established by various acts of parliament and are regulated by the Ministry 
of Human Resource Development (University Grants Commission, n.d.).  For example, in 1966 
the Jawaharlal Nehru University was established by the Jawaharlal Nehru University Act (1966).  
However, it is important to note that until a Constitutional Amendment in 1976, education in India 
was solely under the jurisdiction of individual states (provinces).  Thus, the majority of HEIs in 
India are state universities which are funded and regulated by state-level governments.  Since its 
8 
 
independence, India’s HE has developed rapidly on a relatively weak base (Agarwal, 2007).  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the total enrollments of Indian HE increased by 13% to 14% annually 
(Agarwal, 2007).  Similar to its economic system which contains both public and private sectors, 
in addition to public funded provincial universities, India’s “tradition of private and community 
participation” in HE “continued for a few years after independence” (Agarwal, 2007, p.199).  
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Indian government took over the financial responsibility, 
making previous private HEIs grant-in-aid institutions (Agarwal, 2007).  
During its Second Five-Year Plan (1956–1961), the Indian government began to establish 
the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) as “institutions of national importance” (IIT Act, 1961).  
Autonomous HE development was considered by Nehru to be an essential aspect of non-alignment 
and the key to India retaining its political sovereignty.  Hence, the IITs were among the first central 
universities, and the IIT Acts of 1956 and 1961 provided IITs autonomy, placing them under 
federal authority.  The IITs were extra-constitutional (1950) in nature because they were deemed 
to be a matter of national security, or at least a means for securing the nation.  Pertaining to HE 
development, Nehru’s non-aligned policy practically meant that India could collaborate globally 
with partners from either the West (U.S., U.K., France, West Germany) or the Soviet Union, while 
seeking patterns and partners for establishing IITs in various Indian regions (Indiresan, n.d.).  In 
1951, India already established its first IIT in Kharagpur, which served as an Indian model of 
technical HE.  Nevertheless, international aid played an important role in the IIT projects.  The IIT 
Act of 1956 states that “assistance of different nations to the four IITs would help to produce 
alternative patterns in order to develop different methods of training high level technical 
personnel” (Indiresan & Nigam, 1993, p. 345).  In 1958, IIT-Bombay was established with aid 
from the Soviet Union.  With aid from West Germany, IIT-Madras was founded in 1959.  Also in 
that year, IIT-Kanpur was established with aid from the United States of America.     
The curriculum in the IITs was designed to “develop character, outlook and mental ability” 
for “useful citizenship” (Indiresan & Nigam, 1993, p. 341).  Using MIT as an “example” rather 
than a “model,” the original IIT (Kharagpur) developed its own curriculum, which became the 
basis of the curricula adopted by other IITs (Indiresan & Nigam, 1993, pp. 342–343).  Yet, the 
curricula in different IITs had “some variations” which reflected “the academic traditions of the 
nations from whom they receive technical assistance” (Indiresan & Nigam, 1993, p. 343).  For 
example, at IIT Madras, assisted by West Germany, the emphasis was on workshop, practice, and 
engineering drawing, with special attention paid to the innovation of industries in the region.  IIT 
Madras also introduced the German laboratory system with the establishment of an independent 
laboratory head, workshop, and store.  The curriculum at IIT-Kanpur, assisted by the U.S., had an 
engineering science orientation that emphasized self-study (Indiresan & Nigam, 1993).  
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China followed the 
ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism.  China first imitated and then broke away from both 
the ideology and economic model of the Soviet Union.  From 1953 to 1956, the Chinese 
Communist Party implemented the “Three Major (socialist) Transformations [san da gaizao]” to 
build China into an industrialized socialist country with a state-owned and controlled economic 
system (Dong, 1989).  Similar to India, China’s national investment mainly focused on heavy 
industry and defence (Dong, 1989).  The relations between China and the Soviet Union became 
severely strained by the late 1950s.  In the early 1970s, Mao developed his “Three Worlds Theory” 
which divides countries into three categories: the U.S. and the Soviet Union constitutes the “First 
World”; the “Second World” contains other developed countries (Yee, 1983); and the Asian, 
African, and Latin American developing countries were viewed as the “Third World.”  China’s 
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diplomatic strategy moved from “leaning to one side,” the side of the USSR-led socialist countries 
(1949 to the early 1960s), to antagonizing both superpowers (1966–1976), and finally to 
cooperating with Western nations against the Soviet Union (Qi, C., 1997).  China also began to 
develop its relations with other “Third World” countries from the early 1970s.  
During China’s First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), the Soviet Union provided 156 key 
construction aid projects (150 of them were actually implemented) to help China establish its 
industrial system, mainly in the fields of energy and defence (Sun, 1999).  Up to July 1960, when 
China broke relations with the Soviet Union, over 3000 Soviet experts had been sent to China and 
68 key construction aid projects had been completed during the First Five-Year Plan (Sun, 1999).  
The Soviet Union also provided construction aid in the field of HE.  From 1952 to 1953, with the 
Soviet Union’s aid, China established the Harbin Institute of Military Engineering as a Soviet 
model military engineering university (Zhao, 2006).  The whole Chinese HE system was reformed 
along Soviet lines in 1952.  During the 1960s, internationally self-isolated after the end of Soviet 
aid, China made remarkable achievements in science and technology, especially in the fields of 
heavy industry and defence industry (“Xingjiapo,” 1970).  
Beginning in the 1950s, “all foreign [Western] universities or those financed by foreign 
religious bodies and governments in China were abolished” (Huang, 2003, p. 232).  Closely 
following the Soviet model of HE, China established a highly centralized and structured HE system 
(Yao, 1996).  In the reform of 1952, six major [military] regions became units for political-
administrative planning and HEIs in each region were restructured around specialist definitions of 
knowledge.  Each region was allowed to have “one or two comprehensive universities, one or two 
[leading] polytechnic universities, one major normal university, one to three agricultural 
universities, and other specialist institutions” (Hayhoe, 1996, p. 77).  Some of the previous 
comprehensive universities, such as Tsinghua University and Zhejiang University, were 
restructured into polytechnic universities.  “Department within the universities became more 
specialized; physics, for example, was subdivided into numerous categories such as theoretical 
physics, solid physics, and optics, with a different teaching plan for each” (Wang & Li, 2001, p. 
315).  During this period, HEIs were administrated by different sectors of the central government.  
Leading polytechnic and comprehensive universities were under the Ministry of HE, while 
specialized HEIs, such as those focusing on agriculture, engineering, medicine, economics, 
political science and law, were placed under the relevant national ministries.  
In 1956 Mao Zedong “criticized the practice of ‘total acceptance and mechanical 
application’ of Soviet examples” in his On Ten Major Relationships (Yao, 1996, p. 245).  By 1958, 
China began to break from the Soviet economic model as Sino-Soviet political tensions rose.  
Accordingly, China began to develop its own pattern of HE.  For example, China ended the Soviet-
model practice of separating basic science and technology, and attempted to combine teaching, 
scientific research, and productive labour (Yao, 1996).  Basic science was brought back into the 
specialist polytechnic and engineering universities, and new universities, such as the Chinese 
University of Science and Technology, were founded which brought together areas that had been 
institutionally separated under the Soviet model (Hayhoe, 1996).  
In 1958, the Communist Party published its Instructions on Educational Work stating that 
“education must serve the proletariat” and should be “combined with productive labour.” 
Following this guiding principle, factories attempted to establish universities, while HEIs started 
to set up their own factories (Gao, 2008).  In 1966, China abolished the College Entrance 
Examination and reformed HE admission criteria.  The Chinese government published the Notice 
on the Reforms of College Enrollment Work and established a recommendation-based admission 
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system.  During the “Cultural Revolution,” workers, peasants, soldiers, and some rural youth were 
admitted by HEIs based on recommendations provided by their administrative leaders (Deng, 
2014).  Mao stated that the major purpose of recruiting HE students mainly from workers, peasants, 
and soldiers was to provide opportunities for the productive classes to take part in the creation of 
a new socioeconomic experiment (Shi, Zhou, & Huang, 1974). 
China also decentralized its HE administration system in the later 1950s and enhanced 
provincial-level control.  More attention was given to indigenous knowledge, with the founding of 
colleges of traditional Chinese medicine in every province and autonomous region between 1956 
and 1960 (Hayhoe, 1996).  In September 1958, China proposed the target of popularizing HE in 
15 years under the climate of the “Great Leap Forward” (1958–1960) (Zhou, 2014).  Although this 
target was unrealistic, given the social and economic conditions at that time, Chinese HE did 
experience three consecutive years of expansion.  In 1957, the total number of China’s HEIs was 
229, increasing to 1289 in 1960 (Zhou, 2014).  New provincial comprehensive universities were 
established in most provinces, sometimes absorbing specialist ministry institutions that had 
originally been established and controlled from Beijing.  Relatively underdeveloped provinces and 
autonomous regions such as Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, got their first universities, 
with enthusiastic graduates of some of the best national universities taking up assignments to teach 
there (Hayhoe, 1996). 
 
Discussion  
After their independence, through the Cold War era, India and China attempted to develop and 
implement national models of HE with strong governmental intervention.  Their respective 
ideological foundations, political systems, and development strategies influenced HE development 
in India and China.  Yet, despite differences of ideology and history, post-independence HE reform 
and expansion in India and China were both centrally organized and directed by strong 
national/central governments.  While both were clearly influenced by the Soviet model, neither 
India nor China completely adhered to any particular foreign HE path.  Instead, “tentative” models 
of HE were intended to promote intellectual autonomy in support of newly won political 
sovereignty with “the obvious and pressing demands of a growing industrial society” (Wang & Li, 
2001, p. 315).  Both India and China felt threatened during the Cold War because the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union demanded synchronicity of foreign and domestic policies from their respective 
proxies. 
  The HE legacy of this period is rich.  It has provided the foundation upon which 
contemporary notions of the “superpower” potential (Mahbubani & Chye, 2015) of Indian and 
Chinese HE is based.  Presently, significant proportions of top universities in India and China are 
polytechnic HEIs that were established or reconstructed by the central/national governments 
during the Cold War era.  These include India’s IITs and China’s top polytechnic universities, such 
as Tsinghua University and the University of Science and Technology of China.  China’s strong 
state tradition is still a key element in its HE development.  Although contemporary Chinese HEIs 
have not been given much administrative autonomy compared to India, the scholar-official 
tradition has meant that Chinese intellectuals have felt tremendous responsibility for the state 
(Hayhoe & Liu, 2010). 
Considering economic development and defence capacity, the key to safe-guarding 
national sovereignty, heavy industry, science, and engineering were emphasized as the core 
disciplines to be serviced by HE in India and China.  Indian and Chinese governments attempted 
to establish national HE systems that would enable autonomous development of their economies 
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and societies; it is for this reason that Indian and Chinese HE focused on application-oriented 
engineering and technology disciplines during the Cold War (Biswas & Agrawal, 1994) in contrast 
to their precolonial traditions of holistic education.  Industrialization resulted in the shedding of 
government sponsorship for the arts, culture and spirituality, all of which had been an important 
part of pre-independence and precolonial Indian and Chinese traditions of holistic education.  Post-
independence Indian and Chinese governments considered these features less relevant, outdated, 
or even dangerous, as aspects of the lives of “modern” citizens.  Mao believed that radical political 
movements or revolutions were required for China to free itself from its feudal past.  Nehru 
sympathized with certain aspects of India’s cultural heritage but thought it mostly incompatible 
with the objective of building a modern nation.  Hence, despite differences in governance and 
policy focus, India and China conscientiously modelled their postcolonial HEIs in an effort to 
promote either a sociohistoric or geocultural form of development and modernity that would allow 
them to become globally competitive in the future (Biswas & Agrawal, 1994).  Moreover, both 
national agendas were location and chronologically oriented rather than being adopted or based on 
applied theories originating from the circumstantial experiences of a foreign past. 
Towards the end of the Cold War, after experiencing a series of destructive political 
movements, China’s political leaders in the post-Mao era utilized more pragmatic rather than 
ideological policies to deal with China’s socioeconomic challenges.  Since 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s 
“theory of developing socialism with Chinese characteristics” has become the cornerstone of the 
policy of “Reform and Opening Up” and the development of a “socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics” (Han, 2008; Wei, 2014).  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Indian 
governments of Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh undertook neoliberal economic reforms 
(1991) in India to promote global integration and faster paced economic development (Panagariya, 
2005).  Currently, China and India are the second and third largest economies in the world (GDP-
PPP).  Both countries have made great strides in HE development and are even considered to have 
the potential to become HE “superpowers” (e.g., Mahbubani & Chye, 2015).  
 The current question is perhaps not whether India and China will emerge as contenders for 
global HE dominance, but whether their future development will be accompanied by a 
reconceptualization of Western HE models.  Given their precolonial heritage, India and China 
could infuse HEIs with cultural features based on their unique pedagogical traditions.  With the 
benefit of 70 years of socioeconomic development and political sustainability behind them (since 
their respective independence in 1947 and 1949), India and China could reassert their civilizational 
weight by challenging the global privileging of the Western model of HE.  A South Asian, Sinic, 
or Pan-Asian university could conceivably come into being with an epistemological foundation 
that reconceptualizes the purpose and character of education.  As the majority of nations in the 
post-Cold War globe seek to reset parameters for the international system that embrace 
multipolarity, India and China stand poised to leverage the soft power of their alternate (non-
Western) histories and civilizational traditions, as they move back from the “periphery” to the 
“centre” of the world knowledge system.  For instance, India’s precolonial educational tradition 
of promoting social harmony in accordance with natural and divine law (Crozet, 2012) may have 
positive implications within the context of globalization.  In terms of China, the Confucian notion 
of “harmonious coexistence within diversity [he er butong]” (Hayhoe & Liu, 2010, p. 94) reflects 
a tradition of the toleration of diversity, which may enable China’s HE development to contribute 
to a more harmonious international community 
India’s and China’s historical and philosophical heritage may be further utilized to support 
contemporary HE development strategies.  For instance, the Confucius Institute (CI) project as a 
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cultural and educational diplomacy program based on HE cooperation has been initiated by the 
Chinese government to promote traditional Chinese culture overseas (Lo & Pan, 2014).  The CIs 
are non-profit institutions established in foreign universities on the basis of Sino-foreign HE 
partnerships (Hanban, 2007).  Initiated by the Office of Chinese Language Council International 
(or Hanban), a central-level functional unit of the Chinese government, CIs provide Chinese 
language and cultural education and organize Sino-foreign cultural exchange activities overseas 
(Hanban, 2007).  In a unique Chinese approach to utilizing traditional culture to enhance the 
worldwide influence of its universities, over 500 CIs have been established in 130 
countries/regions since 2004 (Hanban, n.d.).  Correspondingly, as home to worldwide influential 
spiritual traditions and their corresponding philosophies, India might seek to promote an 
educational diplomacy that is both cross-cultural and interdisciplinary.  Indian attempts to resurrect 
the vision of Nalanda University as a Pan-Asian endeavour and its continued IndiAfrica 
collaborations illustrate such possibilities (Pinkney, 2015).  Reinitiated as a concept nearly 800 
years after its destruction, the idea of reviving Nalanda University in 2006 began as an Indian and 
Southeast Asian vision.  At the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2007, the India delegation announced 
their intention to recreate Nalanda as a site for cross-cultural and interdisciplinary HE (Nalanda 
University, n.d.a).  The Nalanda intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding came into 
force at the EAS 2013 and has been signed by 17 nations (Nalanda University, n.d.b).  While its 
self-designated mandate is to help “forge a continent based on the foundations of peace and 
harmony,” Nalanda recognizes that a pan-Asian model of HE is not exclusive of non-Asian 
traditions, but that its core is “hallowed universalism” (Nalanda University, n.d.c, para. 2): 
Our challenge is to match the excellence of Nalanda of the first millennium C.E. for the third 
millennium C.E.  A university of the third millennium has to be universalist in its outlook, open to 
currents of thought and practice from around the globe, and it has to respond to the needs of a 
world which has miles to travel before it can ensure peace and prosperity with equity and hope for 
all the people of the world (Nalanda University, n.d.c, para. 3). 
 
Conclusion 
As source civilizations of exporting knowledge, culture, and philosophy throughout the ancient 
world, India’s and China’s respective status in the world system of knowledge production changed 
dramatically during the period of Western imperialism, moving from the “centre” to the 
“periphery.”  Autonomous HE models established by post-independence India and communist 
China under strong governments are the foundation for the significant socioeconomic 
achievements of these nations today.  During this period, India and China adhered to an HE policy 
that was utilitarian and application-oriented, as an extension of their development strategies.  
Reflecting upon their respective historical roots and development process, it seems appropriate for 
India and China to consider whether their respective precolonial epistemological tradition and 
post-independence national visions as autonomous alternate global stakeholders can be leveraged 
as anchoring points towards the promotion of alternate South Asian, Sinic, and/or Pan-Asian 
models of HE.  
The cosmopolitan appeal of the spiritual foundations of these two civilizations provides 
India and China the potential to utilize their HE development to modify the existing structure of 
the world knowledge system, and to promote a shift from the global privileging of the Western 
mode to the spread and incorporation of diverse epistemological traditions.  Cultures are not 
monolithic; Indian and Chinese ways of knowing and being are alternatives to Western models.  It 
thus seems appropriate to anticipate that the global “re-emergence” of India and China will be 
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accompanied by alternate epistemological and institutional patterns that may shape a future global 
university model. 
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